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Public Benefit and Chronicles of the
Private Interest Hyde Park Paper Mill
Jeffrey E. Lindenthal
Until it was mothballed andput upfor sale in December 1987, a smallpaper mill in Hyde
Park, a neighborhood on the outskirts ofBoston 's city limits, was the oldest continuously
operating paper mill in the United States. This particularplant closing occurred at a time
manufacturing employment in the state hadfallen offprecipitously. It also coincided with
an awareness among some policymakers that recycling programs were urgently needed to
combat a garbage glut, in Massachusetts and states across the nation, attributable to an
increasingly wasteful society and dwindling landfill capacity. Efforts to reopen the Hyde
Park mill served to illuminate a host ofpublic policy concerns, including deindustrializa-
tion, economic development, and recycling. This episode in the life ofthe Hyde Park mill
is a story ofpublic andprivate interest and the complexities that emerge when reconciling
the two, as well as ofa community institution, partnerships renewed, and a commitment to
carry both into thefuture.
Whereas the Making Paper within this Province will be of Public Benefit and Service;
But inasmuch as the Erecting mills for that purpose and providing Workmen and
Materials for the Effecting that Undertaking will necessarily demand a considerable
Disburse of Money for some time before any profit, or gain can arise there-from; And
Whereas Daniel Henchman, Gillam Phillips, Benjamin Faneuil, and Thomas Han-
cock, together with Henry Dering are willing & desirous to Undertake the Manufac-
turing Paper: Wherefore for the Promoting so beneficial a Design; Be it Enacted by
His Excellency the Governour, Council and Representatives in General Court Assem-
bled, and by the Authority of the same, That the sole Privilege and Benefit of making
Paper within this Province shall be to the said men, and to their Associates, for and
during the Term of Ten Years . . . Provided the aforesaid men shall make or cause to be
made within this Province, in the space of Twelve Months . . . Two hundred Rheam of
good Merchantable Brown Paper, and Printing Paper, Sixty Rheam thereof at least to
be Printing Paper, and within the space of Twelve Months next coming, shall cause to
be made within this Province Fifty Rheam of good Merchantable Writing Paper, of
equal goodness with the Paper commonly stampt with the London Arms, over and
above the aforesaid Two hundred Rheam of Brown Paper, and Printing Paper.
Jeffrey E. Lindenthal, a June 1989 graduate ofthe John W. McCormack Institute ofPublic Affairs Master of
Science program, University ofMassachusetts at Boston, is a recycling specialist in San Diego, California.
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An act passed by the Massachusetts General Court on September 28, 1728, to "en-
courage the making of paper in New England" granted a ten-year monopoly on
local production of paper to five prominent Bostonians — an early precedent for public
participation in private ventures deemed to be in the best interest of the commonwealth.
Papermaking in the city of Boston originated in small mills built along the Neponset
River more than two hundred fifty years ago. The fledgling American paper industry,
spawned in the colonies, matured in mills scattered throughout the Northeast. The Hyde
Park paper mill is Boston's last remaining claim to a share of colonial New England's
paper manufacturing heritage. The year 1989 marked its one hundred eighty-eighth anni-
versary and "the mill," as this plant is popularly known, a widely recognized institution
in the local community.
Hyde Park, a small Boston neighborhood bordered on the north by the Neponset River,
is approximately eight miles southeast of the state capitol. The mill sprawls along River
Street between Mattapan and Cleary squares in a largely residential area. From the road
the mill takes shape as a rambling assemblage of single-story red brick buildings that
appear to have been tacked on gradually over the years. The facility houses more than ten
acres of shop space on its twenty-acre site. Inside, two vintage "fourdrinier" papermak-
ing machines form the centerpiece of the manufacturing area in the rear of the plant. 1 The
machines stretch across the shop floor, where continuous sheets of newly formed paper
pass through a long series of steam dryers that generate enough heat to keep the huge area
warm in the winter and hot in the summer.
Until the plant was idled in December 1987, it was the oldest continuously operating
paper mill in the country. In fact, the Hyde Park mill is a contemporary of the papermak-
ing operation begun with support from the Massachusetts General Court in 1728. Begin-
ning in December 1987, this case study chronicles the plant's first protracted shutdown.
Throughout this period the future of the mill remained uncertain despite the fact that two
hundred paperworkers were off the job, that the mill had operated continuously for 186
years, and that several parties appeared willing to purchase the operation with hopes of
reviving the manufacture of paper on the Neponset River.
The public policy implications of this case concern the Hyde Park community, the city
of Boston, and the Commonwealth of Massachusetts. Given the mill's long-term ability to
provide stable jobs, a permanent plant closing would have major economic repercussions
in the Hyde Park community. Another plant closing in Hyde Park would also underscore
the gradual decline of manufacturing in the state economy in recent years. City economic
development officials first involved themselves in the case when the James River Corpo-
ration, after four years of ownership, announced in July 1987 that they were putting the
mill on the market and intended to cease operations in three months whether or not a
buyer was found. The immediate future of the plant's jobs were of vital concern to Hyde
Park's public leaders, Boston mayor Raymond Flynn, and of course, the paperworkers.
Apart from compelling economic and social motivations, efforts to reopen the mill also
focused attention on environmental public policy issues relating to the state's solid waste
disposal crisis. The mill possesses a rare physical asset in the paper industry: an on-site
de-inking facility whose machines allow for the removal of ink from wastepaper. Once ink
is extracted from wastepaper it may then be repulped (forming the feedstock or "furnish"
in the production cycle) and recycled. Given the mill's urban location far from the virgin
pulp forests of northern New England, de-inking wastepaper is an abundant alternative to
virgin pulp feedstock in the manufacturing process.
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Shortly after the mill was put up for sale, one potential buyer came forward with plans
to capitalize on wastepaper de-inking in the manufacturing process. But to implement this
plan the buyer needed publicly guaranteed financial support, assurance of a reliable sup-
ply of low-cost wastepaper, and — as became increasingly clear as months passed by —
political leverage to help secure the purchase of the property. Financing, wastepaper, and
leverage were all variables considered to be within the realm of city or state control. Just
how much control and to what extent public officials could be expected to push the pro-
posed plan became the nexus for debate surrounding the future of the Hyde Park mill.
This particular company was not, however, the only party interested in the mill.
Throughout the fourteen-month shutdown several potential buyers were said to be formu-
lating business plans. One would-be purchaser even appeared to have reached agreement
with the James River Corporation, only to be forced to withdraw its offer after a question-
able financial transaction. In an effort to screen potential buyers and evaluate the ability
of each to retain jobs, the city's Economic Development and Industrial Corporation
(EDIC) requested the right to review any proposals that came forward. EDIC was also
prepared to help a prospective buyer coordinate financing should the need arise.
The paperworkers union, meanwhile, growing increasingly concerned that James River
was not acting in good faith to sell the facility, organized a plant-closing campaign and
adopted the theme "Don't Kill the Mill." This effort galvanized wide-ranging public
support that included a City Hall rally and eventually the specter of arrest at a downtown
picket line. The union's defense of their jobs served to polarize the issue of corporate
responsibility in Hyde Park. James River's decision to cease operations may also be
viewed within the larger context of "deindustrialization" or the trend among burgeoning
corporations to cast off mature assets in the interest of short-term profits and reinvest-
ment.
The revitalization of the Hyde Park mill was heralded by some to be a model opportu-
nity for the governor and one-time presidential hopeful to demonstrate his commitment to
ensuring "good jobs at good wages," to combating urgent environmental issues, and to
reinforcing Massachusetts's frayed industrial base. Others would say that plans for the
Hyde Park mill simply represented too great a public risk— a challenge best left to the
private sector. At a ribbon-cutting ceremony celebrating the reopening of the mill in April
1989, one state official speculated that without a "partnership" born out of public in-
volvement, the mill might never have resumed operations. Mayor Flynn termed the expe-
rience a "model for any future plant closings in Boston." The genesis of these public
pronouncements is the subject of this case study.
Origins of the Hyde Park Paper Mill
The history of papermaking in Massachusetts begins with a tale of publicly granted privi-
lege and private initiative. As the eighteenth century dawned in New England, Boston had
become a hub for printing and bookbinding commerce in the colonies — trade that relied
on a steady supply of paper imported from Europe. In an effort to reduce dependence on
imports, lawmakers were instrumental in helping the infant paper industry take hold in the
New World by granting exclusive contracts and production subsidies. The manufacture of
paper was regarded as a basic public necessity, and government officials employed their
powers to help underwrite development of the craft in these early industrial policies. 2
The five partners in the publicly "encouraged" mill project of 1728 included Thomas
Hancock, uncle of John Hancock, the Massachusetts governor and signer of the Declara-
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tion of Independence, and Benjamin Faneuil, father of Faneuil Hall developer Peter Fa-
neuil. Henry Dering, the first superintendent of this mill, was the only member of the
group who had any experience running a paper mill. Shortly after being awarded their
production contract, the proprietors bought an ad in the New England Weekly Journal
requesting citizens to "save or procure linen rags" for which they would pay cash. This
was still many years before wood pulp would be used in the manufacturing process. Cot-
ton fiber was the primary feedstock for these early mills, and recycling rags offered the
most readily available supply. The men leased a mill building along the Neponset River in
Dorchester and set about the business of papermaking. 3
Ten years passed, but the quality of paper produced at the mill could still not rival that
of the European imports, a deficiency the owners blamed on the lack of skilled paper-
workers in the area. Ownership of the mill changed several times in subsequent years, and
elected officials again had a hand in its future in 1764, when the Massachusetts legislature
was petitioned for a £400 grant to repair the mill, which was granted.
In 1801, two "practical papermakers," Edmund Tileston and Mark Hollingsworth,
established a mill on the Neponset River in Mattapan, the first of many mills the partners
would own. 4 The site of the Tileston and Hollingsworth mill was not far from a spot in
Dorchester where the town, with an interest in collecting taxes on the property, had
granted land to a Milton papermaker to establish a mill in 1773. 5 The Tileston and Hol-
lingsworth company leased this mill in 1806 and purchased the facility thirty years later.
The mill was destroyed by fire in 1837 and the partners built a new facility adjacent to the
old site and chose to remove their Mattapan operations to the location as well. This is the
site of the Hyde Park mill on the Neponset River, its origination commonly traced to 1801.
The Tileston and Hollingsworth Hyde Park mill was noted for its fine plate paper, which
the U.S. government once adopted as its standard, and for high-quality printing paper
favored by the likes of Scribner 's Magazine. Ownership of the Hyde Park mill passed
from Edmund and Mark to their sons Edmund Jr. and Amor, to the sons of Edmund Jr.
and Amor, and remained in the Tileston and Hollingsworth families until the mill was sold
to the Diamond International Corporation in the 1950s.
The Best Little Paper Company in America
The James River Corporation was founded in 1969, when engineers Brenton Halsey and
Robert Williams completed a leveraged paper mill buyout from their employer, the Ethyl
Corporation. Over the next ten years the men developed the company by seeking bargain-
basement deals on antiquated mills owned by larger corporations while carving for them-
selves a niche in the market for specialty papers. 6 In 1981 the company's sales exceeded
$500 million, a figure that would surpass $1.5 billion by 1983. Forbes magazine named
James River "the best little paper company in America" in January 1984, noting that for
the previous five years the company had boasted a 26 percent average return on share-
holders' equity.
James River acquired the Hyde Park mill on July 1 1 , 1983 , as part of a five-mill pack-
age purchased from Diamond International Corporation for approximately $160 million.
In addition to the Hyde Park facility, the deal included plants manufacturing towel and
tissue products, communication papers, a pulp mill, wood-chipping operations, and as-
sorted pulp and paper inventories. In their fiscal year 1984 annual report, the company
estimated that the Diamond acquisition would add $200 million to James River's annual
sales base. Acquisitions such as this were part of a deliberate strategy to integrate James
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River operations more fully by acquiring major pulp reserves and to diversify the
company's product line.
In the fiscal year ending April 24, 1988, James River devoted considerable resources to
international development with the purchase of four European entities. Such aggressive
corporate expansion had transformed the company into a $5 billion multinational corpora-
tion, owner of 133 plants worldwide, the industry's second-largest paper manufacturer.
But despite record-breaking sales, the company's profitability had begun to slip. James
River's corporate growing pains were aggravated in the mid-eighties as the value of the
dollar dropped and pulp prices rose. In a two-year period beginning in mid-1986, virgin
pulp prices had increased more than 65 percent. For a nonintegrated paper company like
James River— one that did not own 100 percent of its pulp supply — increases in the price
of raw materials would cut into profits. Return on shareholders' equity in fiscal year 1988
dipped to 10.7 percent, a healthy return but well below the industry average of 18 percent.
In the United States the company continued to expand and moved to sell smaller "non-
essential operations" — a category that included the Hyde Park mill in the early months of
fiscal year 1988. Later that year James River acquired new assets in Michigan and Missis-
sippi, and a groundwood directory business producing telephone book paper was sold in
Washington for $75 million. At the close of fiscal 1988, James River reported that a "let-
ter of intent," with an option to purchase, had been signed with a third party for the Hyde
Park mill. After deducting losses incurred from the December 1987 Hyde Park shutdown
from the sale of the Washington mill, officials estimated the transactions would yield a net
favorable gain of approximately $.02 per share
Ironically, James River's Hyde Park venture first appeared to offer the Boston paper-
workers a new beginning. In the months preceding the 1983 sale of the mill, paperwork-
ers had begun to worry about the future of their jobs. Diamond International had recently
been bought by the notorious British corporate raider Sir James Goldsmith, a man who
had amassed a fortune selling such acquisitions piece by piece. The union assumed that
the mill would be sold, possibly closed, and for eight or nine months morale had been
"as low as it could go" in the plant.
James River Opens and Closes a Chapter
The sale of the Hyde Park mill to another paper manufacturer was a positive sign for the
workers. But from the outset, James River's long-term plans for the mill were never com-
pletely understood. Union officials recall being told by company management that they
"didn't want the mill" and were much more interested in the integrated mills (those with
a virgin wood pulp supply on site or nearby) they had acquired in Maine in the Diamond
deal. One of the first decisions James River managers made in Hyde Park was to shut
down the de-inking facilities. In a prospectus of the mill made available to potential buyers
when the plant came on the market three years later, James River attributed the decision
"to the narrow cost of pulp and the cost of wastepaper" at the time.
De-inking and recycling had been standard procedure in the Hyde Park mill for decades.
During periods when the price of virgin pulp was running high, the de-inking equipment
ran at full capacity; as the price of pulp fell, de-inking use slacked off. The machines also
allowed the plant to maximize its pulp feedstock. Any scraps, trimmings, or wastepaper
generated in production could always be recycled.
Industry professionals estimate that only five or six paper mills in the United States are
currently manufacturing recycled paper from de-inked wastepaper. The de-inking mill
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nearest to Hyde Park is in Miami, Ohio. Owing to the chemical processes involved and the
necessity to treat wastewater, the cost of de-inking and recycling paper had previously
been comparable with that of paper produced from virgin pulp. During the mid-eighties,
however, the price of virgin materials steadily increased, de-inking technologies im-
proved, and many state and federal officials became interested in recycled paper procure-
ment. Recycling wastepaper was suddenly more economically viable than ever and
offered a partial solution to the nation's garbage glut.
James River began operations in Hyde Park with a backlog of orders for heavyweight
paper (index card stock) that had been placed with Diamond. Following the first six
months of operation, the mill reportedly exceeded James River's profit targets more than
threefold. The union contract came up for renewal after eight months of work under the
new corporate owner. The Hyde Park mill had been a union shop since around the time of
World War JJ, with workers represented by Local 121 of the United Paperworkers Interna-
tional Union. On July 1 , 1984, James River secured a three-year contract with union
paperworkers, who reported that in negotiation "everything went beautifully . . . there
were no problems whatsoever."
Pay in the mill has historically been good. Production personnel typically work a three-
week cycle known as a southern swing shift: seven days on the job followed by one day
off, then seven days on with two days off, and finally, seven days on and four days off.
Shifts alternate with each passing week between 8:00 a.m. and 4:00 p.m, 4:00 p.m. to mid-
night, and midnight to 8:00 a.m. Workers accept the tough schedule because weekend
shifts bring premium pay or time and a half on Saturday and double time on Sunday. Shift
work and premium pay afford paperworkers a decent living — annual pay for Hyde Park
paperworkers averaged $33,000 in 1987. Still, paperworkers are quick to acknowledge
that among the prices they pay for shift work are schedules that don't often match those of
families and friends.
With only two medium-capacity fourdrinier papermaking machines on site, the mill is
now considered small by industry standards. Daily production output when both ma-
chines are up and running has averaged 195 tons per day, with a combined annual produc-
tion capacity in the range of sixty thousand tons. James River began varying the Hyde
Park mill's product mix after the company met back orders for heavyweight paper. James
River management moved the mill's product concentration away from the card stock that
Diamond had been selling in favor of communication papers to meet the needs of com-
mercial printers and book publishers in the New York and Boston areas.
Over the next three years the corporation invested considerable money on equipment in
the plant, including the installation of a paper analysis computer that automatically meas-
ures the ash content, opacity, and weight of newly formed paper. But the largest piece of
machinery to come into the plant, a complex $3.7 million project begun in the summer of
1987 and never fully operational, was a state-of-the-art computerized paper sheeting
(cutting) system from West Germany. Paperworkers were excited about the potential of
the new equipment, figuring it would boost their efficiency and allow the mill to bring in
outside paper to convert during periods when their machines were down. James River had
also been tidying up the exterior of the mill, planting shrubs and painting. Overall, the
plant was in good repair.
Union officials knew that the paper industry had been reckoning with increased prices
for pulp and energy supplies in recent years and that by 1987 their mill had not been prof-
itable in many quarters. After a banner first year in fiscal 1984, James River had report-
edly been posting consecutive losses at the mill. Production had dropped off at the plant
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by almost 25 percent in fiscal years 1985 and 1986, with a corresponding drop in sales of
about 30 percent. 7 These figures accompanied James River's decision to pull out its Hyde
Park sales force and centralize company operations out of state. But despite tough times,
James River had not allowed the Hyde Park mill to deteriorate, and the presence of new
equipment seemed to be proof that the company was committed to Hyde Park operations
over the long haul. At the close of its fiscal year on April 26, 1987, there were signs that
the mill was regaining its past form: production and sales totals were approaching those of
fiscal 1984, although the new equipment expenditures would obviously cut into profits.
When James River's first union contract came up for renegotiation in July 1987, it was
quickly apparent to workers that the future of the plant was uncertain. The company's
proposal had eliminated the premium pay for Saturday and Sunday work. Union officials
were never willing to budge on the issue of premium pay, and one spokesperson labeled
the contract an attempt to "break the union." 8 Union guidelines called for a ten-day nego-
tiation period with a provision to strike the day after it ended on July 17, 1987, if a con-
tract was not signed. The union refused the James River "final offer" — with its cuts in
weekend pay — and voted instead to walk off the job. The company vowed that if a work
stoppage occurred, the mill would be shut down. 9 Contract negotiations had broken off,
but on July 16 the union was offered, and accepted, a ninety-day contract identical to that
of July 1 , 1983. A strike was averted and the mill remained open — for the time being.
Following the aborted contract negotiations, James River began complaining publicly
that the mill was a money loser and announced its intent to sell the plant in ninety days —
by October 16 — or shut down. Despite efforts to shift production from "commodity
paper grade to high return premium paper," according to a company spokesperson,
"efforts were thwarted" by a tight market, cost increases for materials, and the fact that
the mill was nonintegrated. I0 The company made clear that the proposed sale was not a
contract negotiation tool and that it had every intention of leaving Hyde Park. Some two
hundred workers, most of whom lived in Hyde Park, Dorchester, or Roxbury were on the
job at the time. The mood on the shop floor was grim; a spokesperson for the union noted,
"Morale is very, very low, particularly with the older workers . . . We've all been here a
longtime."' 1
While workers were faced with an uncertain future, James River's commitment to
bringing in another paper manufacturer and leaving the community the way it was
found — the oldest paper mill in the country up and running — appeared tenuous. A com-
pany spokesperson told a reporter, "We are actively looking for buyers and hoping that
the interested company will be a manufacturing firm that can continue employment op-
portunities for the workers ... It's up to the buyer and whatever deal they can make."
EDIC Becomes Involved
The nonprofit Economic Development and Industrial Corporation of Boston (EDIC), one
of several quasi-public development agencies in the commonwealth, was established by
the city in 1971 to help Boston manufacturers initiate or expand industrial operations. The
agency offers a wide range of development services, including the power to act as
banker— issuing industrial development bonds or matching firms with state or federal
funding sources — broker, developer, and job trainer.
James River's ultimatum that it would close the plant in three months, whether or not a
new owner was found, grabbed the attention of EDIC and a number of city officials. By
the end of July, EDIC director Marilyn Swartz Lloyd convened a meeting with her staff,
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Hyde Park councillor Thomas Menino, resident manager of the Hyde Park mill James
Matheson, and a James River controller. The fate of the mill's two hundred jobs was of
immediate concern to city officials. Swartz Lloyd came to the meeting prepared to put
James River in touch with professionals who could help with union negotiations, or to
discuss financing options available to stabilize the company's Hyde Park operations.
However, the company's decision had become a foregone conclusion: the corporation was
pulling out of Hyde Park regardless of any change in union position. EDIC, learning that
Kidder Peabody had been retained by James River to screen prospective buyers, contacted
the company to request copies of any purchase proposals so that each could be evaluated
on its own merit for retaining jobs.
Saving jobs in the Hyde Park community became the primary concern of many local
officials. The city of Boston and local community had been stung by the recent $20 mil-
lion sale of the Hyde Park Westinghouse plant, which left one hundred people out of
work. In response to speculative real estate pressures to purchase industrial space and
convert it to more lucrative uses, such as office space or condominiums, EDIC had been
working for months to create an addition to the city's zoning code. The new classification,
to be designated Light Manufacturing Zone (LMZ), was intended to protect existing man-
ufacturing jobs and identify areas where "job-intensive light manufacturing operations"
could develop or expand. LMZ zoning would prevent the sale of a manufacturing facility
for conversion to nonmanufacturing uses. EDIC would be seeking approval for the new
zoning category from the Boston Redevelopment Authority in the fall of 1987.
James River's decision to close the Hyde Park facility by October 16 left little time to
secure the sale of the mill (this was still more than a year before federal plant-closing
legislation mandating a six-month notice became law). In an effort to gauge the mill's
viability, EDIC staff queried plant management, union representatives, local paper dis-
tributors, and commercial printers. Even though former customers expressed concern
that the quality of James River products had been inconsistent in recent years, EDIC con-
cluded that a solid management team could iron out such problems and that the local busi-
ness community was supportive of the Hyde Park mill. Late in the month of August,
EDIC's Swartz Lloyd wrote James River chief executive officer (CEO) Brenton Halsey to
express concern that the October closing would force unrealistic consequences on mill
employees and to request that the company keep the mill open until a new buyer was
found.
On Monday, October 12, James River vice president of corporate planning Phillip
Henns announced that the company would postpone the October 16 closing of the mill
until mid-January. According to a James River spokesperson, it was "important to keep
Hyde Park open to allow the continued transfer of paper grades to other mills in the area
and to continue operating while trying to find another buyer." 12 Workers in the mill agreed
to extend their original 1984 contract for a second three-month term. Henns also stated
that the company was considering two proposals put forward to purchase the mill: one
from the Massachusetts-based Cleer River Corporation, the other from the Conservatree
Paper Company of California. 13 EDIC, in conjunction with Kidder Peabody, was working
to finance a purchase with industrial revenue bonds and, according to Swartz Lloyd, "a
local company tied to a local market, as opposed to a national market [had] a good chance
to succeed." 14
Both these early proposals were concerned with the same end— to continue making
paper in Hyde Park— but each was radically different in means. Conservatree president
Alan Davis first met with James River's Phillip Henns in October and later submitted a
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letter of intent to purchase the mill dated December 23, 1987. Davis's proposal was based
on what he believed was the mill's unique asset — the on-site de-inking equipment neces-
sary to produce recycled paper products. The other proposal was from Joseph Ardini, a
former Hyde Park mill worker, president of Cleer River in Centerville, Massachusetts.
Ardini's business plan reportedly stated his intent to run the plant as a "virgin" mill,
making paper from wood pulp without the benefit of the de-inking facilities.
Ardini had worked for many years at the Hyde Park mill. At one time there were said to
be four Ardini brothers working in the plant, dating back to the fifties when the mill was
owned by Tileston and Hollingsworth. At the time he left in the mid-seventies, Joseph
Ardini had worked his way up to mill manager. Union officers didn't see him again until
1987, although he had a reputation for having opened and subsequently closed two paper
mills in the interim. 15 Then, in late 1987, reportedly backed in part by foreign investors,
Ardini filed an application sponsored by EDIC for financing with the American Develop-
ment Finance Corporation (ADF) to apply toward the purchase price of the mill. The
Ardini application was pending approval in mid-December.
Because the James River Corporation was pulling out of Hyde Park on the basis of its
assertion that the plant was not profitable as a virgin mill, it struck Conservatree owner
Alan Davis as ironic that a former plant manager would come up with a proposal to buy
the mill for precisely the same type of operation. At a meeting with EDIC officials at-
tended by Rob Bauman, Mayor Flynn's environmental affairs adviser, Ardini claimed that
the plant would succeed only as a virgin mill. Further, Ardini chastised "the environmen-
talists" in the room for their youthful naivete and flatly dismissed the notion that recycling
was economically viable in Hyde Park.
Bauman had given considerable thought to the economics of operating the mill and
concluded that the de-inking equipment was the plant's most important asset. He was also
working hard to sell EDIC on the concept of recycling while explaining the role the Hyde
Park mill could play locally. But Bauman found it hard to argue with someone who had
actually worked in the mill. The Ardini business plan had given development officials
reason to believe that recycling wasn't viable in Hyde Park. For a time it appeared that the
Ardini proposal would meet the requirements for ADF program financing and James
River's asking price. Rumors swirling around the mill were that a sale was imminent. The
company's finances, however, were not completely in order. After a Cleer River Corpora-
tion check was rumored to have been presented against insufficient funds, the company's
proposal was withdrawn. 16
Conservatree 's plan to revitalize the mill's de-inking equipment and manufacture paper
from recycled feedstock represented what some public officials believed to be the best
environmental use of the mill: to manufacture paper from the city's wastepaper and simul-
taneously begin to address Boston's mounting solid waste disposal problems. Rob
Bauman was the most articulate advocate to emerge from the early EDIC meetings and
lobby for renewing recycling operations in the mill. Bauman had set up pilot recycling
projects around the city, as well as in City Hall, and quickly understood that the mill could
fill an important void in the local recycling puzzle. Bauman was aware that to secure recy-
cling's long-term economic viability, new markets had to be developed to absorb the in-
creasing supplies of paper, metal, and glass collected through developing municipal and
commercial recycling programs.
Recycling planners are quick to concede that successful recycling ventures must be built
with an economy of scale which ensures that collection strategies, processing centers, and
markets are part of an integrated whole. Implementing a full-scale recycling operation at
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the Hyde Park mill would create steady demand for a large supply of locally generated
wastepaper, a vital link in any local recycling program. Boston area real estate values
combined with neighborhood concerns associated with new development make the siting
of another paper mill within city limits unlikely. But without new industrial capacity to
absorb recyclable feedstocks, Bauman's recycling initiatives could easily fail — a scenario
with potential to cripple future recycling programs in the city.
The Conservatree Plan
Conservatree president Alan Davis first learned of the Hyde Park mill after union negotia-
tions with James River had broken down, and he came to Boston to see the facility in
September 1987. Davis founded Conservatree in 1977 after leaving his job as an attorney
with an environmental foundation. In ten years his company had become the largest
wholesale distributor of recycled printing and writing paper in the United States. With
sales nearing $8 million in 1987, Conservatree had made the Inc. magazine list of fastest
growing companies in three of the previous four years. Record sales growth was attribut-
able in large part to Davis's efforts to stimulate market demand for recycled paper prod-
ucts, particularly in the public sector. The company was largely responsible for laws in
California and Oregon that extend state procurement preferences for the purchase of
recycled paper. 17
Conservatree was also quick to tout the environmental benefits resulting from the man-
ufacture of recycled paper. Having sold more than 36,000 tons of recycled products since
its inception, Conservatree translated that volume of material into savings of more than
350,000 trees, 108,424 kilowatt-hours of electricity, 180 million gallons of water, 14,000
tons of waste diverted from landfills; a reduction in air pollution effluents of 746 tons;
and $566,588 in taxes saved.
The Hyde Park mill presented an ideal opportunity for Davis to create a new company
to manufacture the products Conservatree had been so successfully marketing. The heart
of Davis's business plan was recycling: "The Hyde Park mill will be historically signifi-
cant, both as the paper mill with the longest record of continuous operations in the U.S.
and as the first mill to completely integrate the full cycle of the recycling concept, from
waste supply to marketing programs." The primary components of the Conservatree plan
for the Hyde Park mill included:
• Revitalizing the mill's de-inking equipment to allow the plant to process
high-grade wastepaper bought from commercial brokers; and to later up-
grade de-inking facilities to accept low-grade wastepaper with the under-
standing that this paper would be available in quantity from a proposed
Boston materials recovery facility at low cost.
• Reducing energy costs associated with paper manufacturing by installing
electrical cogeneration equipment capable of meeting the mill's energy
needs and generating revenue by selling surplus electricity to Boston Edi-
son.
• Restructuring management and streamlining production in an effort to
maximize productivity; creating an employee stock ownership plan (ESOP)
extending workers 30 percent plant ownership and representation on the
executive board with veto power over investment decisions. The ESOP
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would be financed through employee payroll deductions approximating
$5,000 per worker.
• Marketing activity directed at creating a niche for the mill's recycled paper
(to be the only such producer of recycled printing and writing paper in the
Northeast) drawn from an internal sales group and existing Conservatree
distribution channels.
Davis knew that the Hyde Park plant had great potential as a recycled-paper mill and
that it presented a formidable financial challenge. The Conservatree business plan was
premised on the notion that the mill could be acquired before James River shut down
operations. Once the plant was idle and boilers were turned off, pipes would begin to
corrode. Davis estimated that rehabilitating equipment after a shutdown would add $ 1
million to start-up costs. Another important consideration for keeping the mill open had to
do with labor. Once the mill was down for a prolonged period, any new owner would risk
losing the old work force, and skilled paperworkers are a scarce commodity in the Boston
labor market. Davis's operational priority was to get in the mill before it was mothballed,
but should the mill have closed, he believed, James River must assume responsibility for
absorbing start-up costs.
Davis made his pitch for the mill before an employees' meeting on November 21 and
again at a union meeting on December 20, 1987. At those gatherings Davis illustrated his
vision for the mill by explaining the ESOP while projecting that two hundred workers
would be back on the job, that $2 million would be invested to revitalize the plant, and that
a planned materials-recovery facility could supply 60 percent of the mill's furnish. The
scope of the Conservatree plan initially caught union members by surprise, but they
quickly warmed up to the proposal: "When Davis came on the scene, even though it
sounded a little farfetched, we thought maybe he had something here ... It would have
been a fantastic deal for us in the long run."
Davis's initial offer to James River was rumored to be in the neighborhood of $5-$6
million, far short ofJames River's asking price of approximately $15 million. That figure
was regarded by Davis to be oriented to the company's book value for the mill, rather than
a fair market appraisal; at auction he estimated the mill would sell for $3.5-$4 million.
Alan Davis had won the support of Hyde Park paperworkers for his plan. The task be-
fore him was to try to convince James River to accept what he considered to be a fair
offer. In effect, Davis was hoping to acquire the mill the same way Halsey and Williams
had built the James River company. "Our job in the next few days," he wrote union mem-
bers in January, "is to make it clear to James River that selling the Hyde Park mill to its
employees and Conservatree has significance, and the potential to generate tremendous
goodwill for James River, that far outweighs the dollars that keep us from reaching agree-
ment. Moreover, their decision to walk away from the Hyde Park mill will have negative
public relations consequences which makes that decision even more uneconomic." James
River never formally responded to this first Conservatree offer and the bid subsequently
expired.
Oldest U.S. Paper Mill Closed
On December 18, 1987, the James River Corporation appeared to have made its last roll
of paper in Hyde Park. The company closed the plant for the holidays and later negotiated
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a three-week severance agreement with the union. Staff at EDIC who were monitoring
James River's progress in selling the mill had begun to grow concerned that the company
was not doing all it might to "solicit good prospective buyers." These concerns must
certainly have been exacerbated after the mill was closed and workers were off the job.
In an effort to evaluate the mill's potential as a full-scale recycling operation, EDIC
commissioned a study by Arthur D. Little, Inc. (ADL), the Cambridge consulting firm.
EDIC also collaborated on an additional study contracted to the Industrial Cooperative
Association (ICA) of Somerville. The ICA evaluated two options for worker ownership in
the mill: the feasibility of a 100 percent worker buyout, and the Conservatree 30 percent
joint ownership plan. The ICA study was paid for by the union's international office with
additional funding from EDIC and the state's Industrial Services Program (ISP).
If Rob Bauman felt professionally vindicated when the Ardini proposal to acquire the
mill collapsed, the ADL study confirmed his belief that revitalizing the mill's de-inking
equipment and manufacturing high-grade recycled paper was economically viable: "The
report showed that marketwise you could seize a really nice niche selling that paper and
the mill was set up to do that . . . The de-inking was the critical link." Bauman commis-
sioned a study of his own in early January that was performed by Anne Scheinberg, a
recycling consultant, to critique the economics of the Conservatree business plan and its
potential impact on the development of recycling in Boston. The report supported the
Conservatree recycling plan in concept but raised questions regarding its implementation,
including:
• the importance of continuity in technical management at the mill;
• the disposal of effluent and sludge generated by the de-inking equipment;
• the ability of the city or state to generate a reliable supply of wastepaper;
and
• inadequate state procurement policies that could inhibit Conservatree 's
government marketing efforts in the commonwealth.
It was up to Conservatree to fine-tune the technical considerations of these concerns,
while the state's participation was a matter of existing legislation and policies outlined in
the Solid Waste Act of 1987.
The Role of Recycling in a Solid Waste Master Plan
In addition to a prolonged state fiscal imbroglio precipitated by falling tax revenues, an
economic slowdown, and neglect, Massachusetts is reckoning with severe environmental
problems, including hundreds of hazardous waste sites, the infamous Boston Harbor, and
a solid waste disposal "crisis." Estimates peg the volume of trash generated in the com-
monwealth each year at 6.1 million tons. Of this, only 7 percent was recycled in 1988 —
attributable largely to the bottle bill; 31 percent was burned in private incinerators and
waste-to-energy facilities, and the remaining 62 percent was landfilled in and out of state.
By the year 2000, the amount of municipal waste generated in the commonwealth is ex-
pected to top 7 million tons a year. 18
In 1988, Massachusetts landfills could accommodate only 3.4 million tons of trash and
nearly one million tons were trucked out of state. The prognosis for the immediate future
is alarming: by 1996 most of the municipal landfills now in operation will be closed. To
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help make up the difference in lost disposal capacity, the state is looking toward incinera-
tion and recycling. Incineration capacity grew to 48 percent in 1990, with more likely to
be added. The Department of Environmental Protection has estimated that even with a 10
percent reduction in waste, and with recycling and composting projected to absorb 34
percent of the waste stream in 1996, the state still faces an 8 percent landfill capacity
shortfall in 1992, with the potential to rise to 12 percent by 2000. Such statistics point to
the realization that there are no easy or cheap remedies for the disposal debacle now con-
fronting the commonwealth.
In 1985 Governor Michael Dukakis and Secretary of Environmental Affairs James S.
Hoyte issued a report entitled A Solid Waste Plan for Massachusetts. That study outlined a
goal to adopt a "50-25-25" disposal scheme in the commonwealth by incinerating 50
percent of all solid waste, recycling 25 percent, and landfilling 25 percent. Proclaiming
that "this is the year of the environment . . . this state's economy depends on a clean and
healthy environment," Governor Dukakis signed the Solid Waste Act in December 1987.
This legislation was intended to put some muscle into efforts to combat the disposal crisis
by allocating funds to close leaking landfills, open safe landfills and incinerators, and by
charging the Department of Environmental Quality Engineering (DEQE) with a mandate
to draft an integrated solid waste master plan for the commonwealth. Toward that end, the
$260 million package appropriated funding for immediate action that was to include de-
velopment of five or six regional resource recovery facilities.
Given the pollution and storage concerns associated with town landfills and the astro-
nomical costs associated with cleanup, municipalities will be hard pressed to cope with
their disposal problems independently in the years ahead. The unique characteristic of the
regional recycling program in the Solid Waste Act is that it charted a regional approach to
solid waste disposal. The essence of the program was to redirect a portion of the solid
waste stream back to materials production and thereby reduce the quantity of material to
be disposed of. To implement this concept the state would construct a regional network of
materials recovery facilities (MRFs). These could serve populations of up to 450,000,
functioning as large-scale collection and sorting facilities for glass, metal, paper, and
plastic. As outlined in the Solid Waste Act, MRFs represent a three-way partnership
among participating communities, private contractors, and the state to forge a materials
recovery infrastructure.
Six MRFs were planned in the first phase of the statewide program, with twelve plants
projected to be operational by the end of the century. 19 Each facility would be designed to
recycle up to 50,000 tons of materials per year. Operating at full capacity, six MRFs
would process 300,000 tons of materials per year; twelve MRFs would handle 600,000
tons — approximately 10 percent of all waste generated in the state. The DEQE has since
scaled back plans to build the MRFs. The first draft of the solid waste master plan (one of
three requested by the legislature, to be accompanied by one year of review and public
dialogue), released by the agency in December 1988, called for only three MRFs: in
Springfield, Cambridge, and Boston.
The commonwealth's regional recycling plan has served as a model for other states and
is being successfully duplicated in Connecticut and Rhode Island. But the implementation
of the program in Massachusetts has been prone to criticism. The first materials recovery
facility, slated for Springfield, was to be operational by the spring of 1988 but didn't come
on line until January of 1990. A Boston Globe editorial of February 3, 1988, character-
ized the state's solid waste policies as "half-baked ideas, mixed signals, abrupt turns,
missed opportunities and the failure to produce . . . Optimism about regional recycling
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centers (and the promise of one for the Springfield area by year's end) is merely talk in
the absence of a marketing strategy for the products of these centers."
The Conservatree business plan called for reactivating the Hyde Park mill's de-inking
equipment with the assumption that a state- or city-operated materials recovery facility
would ensure a steady supply of wastepaper. Alan Davis expected that MRF-supplied
wastepaper could be purchased for approximately $30 per ton, a price well below market
value for high-grade "brokered" wastepaper (office and computer paper collected from
cooperating businesses by private firms).
But with the state well behind schedule on the regional recycling program and no Bos-
ton MRF on the immediate horizon, Conservatree could not bank on any MRF-supplied
wastepaper. However, the Scheinberg study concluded that the Hyde Park mill might well
develop wastepaper supplies from the very businesses to which it hoped to market recy-
cled papers — at a cost equal to or below the $30 per ton budgeted. Such a plan would
effectively create a closed recycling loop between waste supplies, remanufacture, and a
secured market, a concept symbolized in the three interlocking arrows that form the uni-
versal recycling logo. These three components are the essence of any viable recycling
operation.
Local 121 Organizes to Save the Mill
In the beginning there hadn't been much talk of fighting the James River plant closing
among its workers. Following the December 1987 shutdown and severance agreement,
Hyde Park paperworkers were on their own (some participated in job retraining programs
set up by the state's Industrial Services Program while others waited and hoped the mill
would reopen). James River was also downplaying the idea that the mill would ever pro-
duce again. At the close of 1987 a company official told union members that the plant
would never reopen and that it was in their best interest to drop any idea of a plant-closing
protest and find new jobs.
Local 121 's international representative had been in contact with international head-
quarters, as had Alan Davis. Top officials at the international subsequently made a deci-
sion to commit union resources to the Hyde Park local in an effort to secure the livelihood
of the mill and its jobs. A veteran union organizer from New Bedford, Ron Carver, was
enlisted to help the paperworkers develop a campaign to save the mill. With many years'
experience as a union representative and planner of numerous plant-closing campaigns,
Carver may be best known for orchestrating a multiyear effort to prevent a closing of New
Bedford's Morse Tool Company in the early to middle eighties. The Morse Tool cam-
paign proved that a union could successfully fight a parent company's claim that local
operations were not viable and further demonstrated that a corporate parent could be held
accountable for the future well-being of its plant.
There are many remarkable similarities between the Hyde Park paper mill and the
Morse Tool plant. Each is more than a century old and had passed from generations of
family ownership to large corporate interests in recent years. When profits lagged, man-
agement in both plants had asked their unions to concede to wholesale salary and benefit
cuts. Failing to win major concessions, and perhaps inevitably, management at each facil-
ity warned of an imminent sale or plant closing, a pattern characteristic of the ongoing
phenomenon of deindustrialization among America's aging industries. Given the uncer-
tain future, state economic development assistance would be necessary in proposals to
revitalize the Morse Tool Company and the Hyde Park mill.
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As a result of his organizing the Morse Tool union, Ron Carver had consummate
knowledge of the machinations of Massachusetts 's economic development agencies. He
came to Hyde Park in February 1988 and revived a theme that had been the lifeblood of
the Morse Tool campaign: this was not an anonymous factory that was closing, but a vital
resource — a "community institution" and bastion of "good jobs and good wages" for
generations. As he had in New Bedford, Carver was preparing the Hyde Park union to
fight the plant closing on a "moral, if not legal" foundation.
While Hyde Park union members had been in contact with city officials in the months
prior to the mill closing, the local had begun to lose momentum. Some city and James
River officials believed that the members had in fact resigned themselves to the closure
and to James River's claim that the plant was not profitable. At his first meeting with
members of the Hyde Park local, Carver outlined his "bottom line" belief that "unions
and their communities should be highly skeptical of an owner's view that a plant is not
viable." In New Bedford, he said, the union had proved that while many of their competi-
tors were continually reinvesting in operations, their facility had been allowed to lag far
behind and become outmoded. In Hyde Park, the union never understood James River's
rationale for shutting down the de-inking equipment and in recent years felt that the com-
pany was using this mill as a training ground for rookie managers and executives. Viabil-
ity, Carver told the union, is influenced by management decisions beyond the short-term
scope of quarterly earnings and annual profits.
Carver was also concerned, as were many city officials, that James River was not doing
everything within its power to come to terms with potential buyers for the mill. "What we
had to do," Carver explained, "was raise the stakes so that it would be more advantageous
for James River to get rid of it . . . Our campaign was based on the proposition that James
River should cut the best deal they could and do it quickly while the plant remained viable
and the workforce reasonably intact." The ultimate fate of the mill, Carver believed,
could be influenced by the union but would depend on the members' willingness to work
for it. The local's commitment early in the winter of 1988 appeared tentative. Following
the first organizational meeting with Carver, the local's president and vice president
never returned. (The president reportedly left the area and the vice president took another
job.) Local leadership had to be totally rebuilt. John Connolly and Matie Shiel, each with
more than seventeen years in the mill, were elected president and treasurer, respectively,
and Joanne Gaines, with eight years' experience, was elected sergeant at arms.
At a State House reception on February 19, ten days before the Maine presidential
caucus, Governor Michael Dukakis signed a proclamation presented by the Jay, Maine,
local of the United Paperworkers International Union endorsing their "struggle for jus-
tice." The governor was introduced at the gathering by state secretary of labor Paul Eus-
tace as "a friend of labor" and a presidential candidate with organized labor on his White
House agenda. Members of the Hyde Park local were no doubt counting on the governor's
support for their agenda to reopen the Hyde Park mill. Despite repeated attempts, includ-
ing letters and telegrams of support sent from union leaders around the country, the Hyde
Park paperworkers were never able to meet with the governor.
Conservatree Rallies Support
Conservatree was in the news again following a Hyde Park community meeting on Febru-
ary 29 to discuss the environmental concerns associated with the company's de-inking
and recycling intentions. Former plant workers arrived at the packed meeting with green
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and white ribbons pinned to their chests. Alan Davis received enthusiastic support from
workers and responded to concerns from neighbors regarding the plant's potential impact
on the local community. A former plant engineer and de-inking expert, who had been
hired as a technical consultant by Conservatree, explained Davis's plan to build a state-of-
the-art effluent treatment plant to deal with wastewater. While Conservatree made clear
its eagerness to implement its plans and welcome former workers back to the mill, city
officials tempered the meeting with the realization that "there is no deal on the table, no
purchase and sale agreement between the two companies." 20
It was nearly three months since Conservatree 's first bid to James River had been pre-
sented, and Davis's latest offer was reportedly in the range of $8 million. James River,
meanwhile, dropped its asking price for the mill to $11 million, a figure some private-
sector appraisers still felt was unrealistic, given the costs associated with restarting the
facility.
Conservatree was looking to the state for a loan guarantee and for a commitment to help
influence James River to sell. By this time, following many discussions with economic
development staff and financial consultants, Conservatree had refined its Hyde Park
business plan and reduced its state loan guarantee requirement to approximately $4.5
million. Davis had also identified private sources willing to finance upward of $15 million
once the state guarantee was in place. Conservatree' s total financial package was in excess
of $20 million and included capital to overhaul and upgrade de-inking equipment in addi-
tion to money needed to build the cogeneration plant and offset start-up operating losses.
State economic development staff agreed that Conservatree 's plans for worker owner-
ship and the environmental benefits associated with recycling were commendable, but the
package as a whole was considered financially risky and called for "extraordinary" state
participation. Compared to similar proposals, such as that made by the Quincy Shipyard
workers, some felt that "a disproportionate share of the risk" in the Conservatree busi-
ness plan would be carried by the state and that " [Conservatree] needed to find ways to
share the risk." Rebecca Callahan, a regional coordinator in the state's economic develop-
ment office, estimated that the state would have been able to provide $1 .5-$2 million in
loan guarantees, but that was "stretching our authority as far as we could." One news-
paper account quoted a state official as saying that the venture might be too large for a
company of Conservatree' s size ($8 million in sales the previous year).
Conservatree was also asking the state for political support to help leverage sale of the
mill from James River. This request proved much more difficult to quantify than a loan
guarantee, and many development officials clearly were not comfortable with the idea.
More than one staff person acknowledged that it was not their job to pick winners and
losers but to help arrange financing.
Conservatree believed, and the union concurred, that its plan was the best to be offered
for the mill and that James River was obligated to the workers and community to sell to a
buyer that would carry on the business of paper manufacturing while the plant was still
operable. But James River appeared to be in no big hurry to cut a deal with Conservatree.
Several people involved with the ongoing negotiations speculated privately that because
of Davis's aggressive tactics, James River "wouldn't have sold to Conservatree in a
hundred years."
It's also quite possible that James River was simply too preoccupied with business else-
where to devote much attention to Hyde Park and the expedient sale of the mill. Through-
out fiscal 1988 James River had been rapidly increasing its manufacturing presence in the
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European marketplace: acquiring a 50 percent interest in a French paper company, form-
ing a joint venture in Sweden, purchasing two mills in the United Kingdom and a small
plant in Ireland. At the close of that year, just weeks before a lease for the mill was
ultimately signed, the company's net income had jumped 23 percent and annual sales
cracked $5 billion for the first time.
Appeals to Governor Dukakis
While work was under way to best craft the Conservatree business plan to meet require-
ments for a state loan guarantee, efforts to win political support and leverage a sale from
James River intensified. On Thursday, March 3, Alan Davis elevated the public campaign
to focus attention on the mill a notch when he delivered an "open letter" to Governor
Dukakis's office requesting the governor's "personal intervention in a project which will
have significant benefits to the economy, environment and people of Massachusetts." The
letter read, in part:
Without your leadership, Conservatree Paper Company's plan to reopen the Hyde Park
mill and put over two hundred employees back to work transforming up to 20 percent
of Boston's trash into printing paper will not reach fruition. Though considerable
union, financial, technical and community support is already in place, the project has
become bogged down due to a lack of leadership from state officials.
If this project is to reach fruition, your immediate, direct assistance is vital to:
1
.
Help persuade the James River Corporation to sell the plant at a fair market
price.
2. Obtain state loan guarantees necessary to leverage private financing.
3. Expeditious, but thorough, processing of our permit applications relating to
a new cogeneration facility and authorizations to operate a paper mill.
4. A state procurement policy which establishes a preference for purchasing
recycled paper. Massachusetts is twelve years behind California and eight
years behind New York in establishing such procedures.
State assistance to this project is crucial and warranted because it is the Common-
wealth and its citizens who will reap the environmental and economic benefits. For
five months, Conservatree has sought help from a variety of state agencies. As yet, we
have received no tangible support. It is not clear who is in charge of helping launch a
valuable project like this one, what resources are available to aid it, or even if there is a
coherent state policy dealing with recycling.
Governor, this is a perfect opportunity to demonstrate your leadership.
The letter was released at a Parker House press conference later that day. Speaking to the
press, Davis estimated that "even though state loan guarantees should never be tapped,
the state's commitment will produce a payoff of over four million dollars annually in
avoided waste disposal costs." A spokesman for the union then announced plans to initiate
a petition calling on James River to sell the mill. The laid-off paperworkers would soon be
losing their extended unemployment benefits, and Davis was increasingly concerned that
former employees would begin to scatter and seek jobs elsewhere.
On Saturday, March 5, a Boston Globe editorial charged that "the administration has
done little to help the [Conservatree] plan become reality." The column singled out Duka-
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kis economics adviser Alden Raine and urged the Dukakis administration to "encourage
James River to sell the plant to a buyer that is best able to set up the recycling operation."
The editorial concluded that "the key element is recycling."
While Davis had been working to line up a loan guarantee with the state, there were
exploratory discussions among a few city officials regarding leverage the city could bring
to bear on James River. One such option concerned the possibility of the city's taking the
Hyde Park mill by eminent domain. Talk of such a procedure had previously come up in
City Hall — most recently with regard to the Colonial meat-packing plant in South Boston
(the city later chose not to pursue the Colonial plant on the advice of legal counsel, a deci-
sion some felt was reached with ideological rather than legal precedent).
A classic example of the use of eminent domain being threatened can be found in New
Bedford. The Morse Tool Company's absentee corporate parent had indicated that the
company would be forced to close the facility and sell to a buyer that might liquidate its
assets. The mayor of New Bedford countered that the city was prepared in that case to take
the plant by eminent domain and sell it to a buyer who was committed to manufacturing.
The company subsequently chose to keep the plant operational while continuing to look
for an appropriate buyer.
An eminent domain procedure would have allowed the city of Boston to exercise its
bonding authority to raise capital for the purchase of the mill at a price determined to be
of fair market value. The plant could then be leased to an operator and the city might
provide additional support by stabilizing taxes on the property until the operation was
viable. It was estimated that use of city bonds would pose little burden to taxpayers (ap-
proximately $100,000 a year), although development staff were divided on the issue. But
as months dragged on and the plant remained closed, top city officials were reviewing
plans to initiate an eminent domain purchase.
Don't Kill the Mill
Ron Carver was skeptical of the city's commitment to seize the mill by eminent domain.
Politically, he figured, it was too sensitive an issue. However, Carver had come up with
what he considered to be a reasonable (and politically much less delicate) alternative:
rather than pursue eminent domain, city resources (specifically EDIC's) would be better
spent shaping the Conservatree business plan. Carver proposed that EDIC again employ
Arthur D. Little, this time to rework the Conservatree business plan with an eye toward
easing or eliminating its dependence on state loan guarantees. The union, Carver
stressed, did not want to work with a buyer that didn't promise financial stability.
Having seen buyers for the mill surface in past months only to fall by the wayside, union
members felt that any business plan that came forward would need refining, that none would
be perfect. Development officials at EDIC contended that any prospective owner serious
about its bid should invest its own money in its own business plan. An investment of the
nature Carver was proposing appeared to be without precedent at EDIC, and was probably
never considered as a low-profile alternative to eminent domain. After all, most of the talk
involving the use ofeminent domain seemed to be coming from City Hall, not EDIC.
Despite this stalemate, support for the paperworkers emerged from some very unlikely
sources. Following a profile of the Hyde Park closing on public television's Channel 2
news, the securities firm of Drexel Burnham Lambert contacted the union with an interest
in helping finance the proposed Conservatree ESOP. Although Drexel is best known for
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its junk bond transactions, the firm also had a reputation for working to develop employee
ownership deals, including the plan put together by the Quincy shipbuilders to reopen
their shipyard. Drexel's involvement made the overall Conservatree proposal "more at-
tractive" to development officials, but EDIC and Carver remained at odds over the issue
of contracting a consulting group to refine the Conservatree business plan at the city's
expense.
With the passing of the ides of March the union stepped up its Don't Kill the Mill cam-
paign. Efforts to pressure James River to sell the mill to an owner that would continue
manufacturing paper intensified. Ron Carver had charged that James River would prefer
to sell the plant as a general industrial property rather than pass it along to another paper
manufacturer that would ultimately be competing in the specialty papers marketplace with
other James River mills. Avoiding competition with a future owner was a concern James
River previously had raised with regard to the theoretical framework for a 100 percent
employee buyout. The company had said it was willing to consider such an option only if
the workers would agree not to produce text and cover paper, the company's leading prod-
ucts, for a five-year period. The rationale for such an agreement is enigmatic, given that
the Hyde Park mill's manufacturing capacity represented only a tiny fraction of James
River's total output.
On Tuesday, March 22, Senator William Keating submitted a resolution to the Massa-
chusetts Senate urging James River to "reach a timely sale at fair market value with any
potential buyer able to provide the mill workers and the city of Boston with such an em-
ployee-owned recycling mill at . . . the Hyde Park location." By the company's own ac-
count, James River didn't have any offers on the table at that time — a Conservatree bid
could not be officially tendered until the state guarantee was in place, although James
River certainly was aware of Conservatree 's intent. Union officials were adamant that
James River was stalling and insisted that the company was obligated to facilitate a sale:
"The company has a social responsibility to treat the mill just like a community resource,
just like water, just like air. They have to treat this community resource with respect and
leave it just as they found it."
Less than one week later the Boston City Council passed a resolution urging the James
River Corporation to negotiate with potential buyers and for EDIC and the state's Eco-
nomic Development Office to assist any interested parties. City Councillor Rosaria Sa-
lerno went one step further and wrote James River CEO Brenton Halsey to "strongly
support this Resolution and urge that James River negotiate the sale of the Hyde Park mill
to Conservatree Paper Company." Salerno maintained that the mill had been on the market
for some time, that Conservatree remained interested in the purchase, and that Conserva-
tree was committed to the union as well as to recycling. The letter concluded, "I also
believe the City of Boston should use the resources at its disposal to assist in the equitable
sale of the mill to Conservatree. Thus I will continue to urge city officials and members of
the City Council to become more involved in efforts to reopen the Hyde Park mill."
The union planned to launch a petition drive at a City Hall press conference on April 5
to build support for its campaign. At that press conference, flanked by a garbage truck
with a banner that read "Don't Kill the Mill! " and "Save Good Clean Jobs," the union
began collecting thousands of signatures. The petition was coordinated to call attention to
the unresolved future of mill jobs and to promote the Conservatree plan as the best solu-
tion for saving jobs and recycling paper. The first signature on the petition was that of
Mayor Raymond Flynn.
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Union officials were naturally frustrated that not all public officials could be as forth-
right with their support for the union/Conservatree package as Councillor Salerno had
been. Some of this frustration turned to anger when it was learned that during the rally a
top state labor official had taken a city employee aside and suggested that it would be wise
to exercise caution with union involvement. It was intimated that other potential buyers
were looking at the mill and that Conservatree was not the only game in town. Why, union
members wondered, would a high-ranking labor official fail to throw solid support behind
what they regarded as their best option? The offhand remark was viewed contemptuously
by the union as an attempt to "scuttle the whole damn thing."
In a news story covering the rally that evening, it was reported that James River had
turned off the mill's boilers a week earlier. With the heating system down, the mill's
plumbing was prone to corrosion, and future start-up costs would begin to mount. The
union campaign pressed on with a new sense of urgency.
Communication Breakthrough
The days and weeks following the City Hall rally were again marked by intense activity on
many fronts. State Representative Angelo Scaccia was instrumental in convening a meet-
ing with union officials, Alan Davis, Alden Raine, and economic affairs secretary Joseph
Alviani. At that meeting, Secretary Alviani appeared concerned and surprised that the
state had been slow to respond and asked Raine to put together a task force to work on the
Conservatree plan. Carver had earlier approached the Industrial Services Program for
support, only to learn that ISP was juggling many projects at the time and couldn't dedi-
cate a staffmember to the project. But following the formation of Alviani's task force,
one of the agency's leading staff members was assigned to the Hyde Park case.
The task force then met with Alan Davis to flesh out some of the "difficult assump-
tions" that were incorporated into Conservatree' s bottom line. These included the avail-
ability of state-supplied wastepaper, bringing cogeneration facilities on line, and market
conditions for paper.
In a follow-up letter to Alden Raine, Davis pointed out that the first two assumptions
concerning wastepaper availability and cogeneration permitting were largely within state
control. With regard to the paper market, Davis emphasized that "we are today in the best
paper market in history, and prices are already 5 to 10 percent higher than they were at the
beginning of the year. Nobody can predict what the market will be like in 1989 or 1990,
but we do know that we are ahead of the game ... I might be so bold as to suggest that
there are few if any economic development projects that present such an opportunity:
maintenance of industrial jobs; employee ownership; clean energy production; and a
worldwide model for alleviating the solid waste problem. And all of this can likely be
achieved at no cost to the taxpapers of Massachusetts."
In early May, Conservatree submitted its final offer.
Union Message Delivered in Virginia
After weeks spent gathering signatures in support of its effort, the union delivered its
petition to James River: large advertisements were purchased in the two newspapers of the
company's hometown, Richmond, Virginia, on May 3. The ads were crafted as an open
letter to James River CEO Brenton Halsey and president Robert Williams, urging them to
expedite the sale of the mill and leave the Hyde Park community the way they found it:
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Four years ago, James River Corporation bought the mill. This January you locked the
doors. We realize that legally, as suits your business needs, you can close it, board it
up, or tear it down.
But the mill is an important economic resource for our community. And it's our
friends, neighbors, and relatives who were put out of work. We know the victims; we
see the social costs of plant closings — broken families, substance abuse, and despair.
Sometimes these tragedies are inevitable. But in this case there is hope. By your own
account, other companies have indicated that our mill could fit into their future. They
have proposed reopening the mill to process recycled paper.
Time is running out. Soon the equipment will deteriorate, the workers will disperse,
potential buyers will withdraw, and we will be left with another boarded-up factory.
James River Corporation's commitment to conservation is well known. We hope you
will extend that commitment to the Hyde Park mill, and leave it as you found it, a
viable functioning business.
The ads carried the names of many prominent city officials, including Mayor Flynn and
City Councillors Menino and Salerno; labor leaders such as Arthur Osborn, president of
the Massachusetts AFL-CIO, Joseph Joyce, president of the Greater Boston Labor Coun-
cil, and Joanie Parker, president of the Boston Coalition of Labor Union Women. James
Sullivan, president of the Boston Chamber of Commerce, and John Paraskevakos, presi-
dent of the Hyde Park Board of Trade signed on, representing the business community.
The list also included several environmental advocates, community activists, Robert Cor-
rigan, chancellor, University of Massachusetts at Boston, cultural luminaries like Sarah
Caldwell of the Opera Company of Boston, and basketball star Bill Walton. Aside from
Representative Angelo Scaccia and Senator William Keating, however, state officials
were conspicuously absent from the list.
In the event that the advertisements did not draw a response from James River, union
officials began coordinating a bus convoy that would travel to Washington, D.C. , to meet
the New England congressional delegation, then journey on to rally in Richmond, on
James River's doorstep. In this phase of the protest, workers planned to draw attention to
their Hyde Park mill as a "monument to corporate arrogance."
As the external pressure on James River to deal with the Hyde Park mill reached a fever
pitch, the multibillion-dollar corporation began to send new signals. Company officials
contacted Alan Davis and asked him to submit another bid for the mill. Davis offered $8.5
million and was told "to expect a decision within 10 days to two weeks." 21 But at the mo-
ment it appeared that James River was moving to act on the Conservatree bid, it was
learned that another proposal had come forward, from the Tennessee-based Nolichucky
Industries Corporation. 22
In substance, the two proposals were completely different. Under the Nolichucky plan
the company would lease the mill with an option to purchase in the future. Nolichucky did
not, however, plan to produce high-grade paper in the mill. Instead, the company pro-
posed to manufacture corrugating medium or the rippled liner found between layers of
cardboard. This material could be made from recycled fiber although it would not require
use of the mill's de-inking equipment. According to one paperworker, you could sweep
the streets, bring that material in, and make liner out of it. Nolichucky also did not extend
a worker ownership offer to the union, although the company was said to be willing to
work with the local. Union members would later claim that James River had "gone out
and found Nolichucky."
29
New England Journal of Public Policy
State development officials reviewed the Nolichucky proposal and in a conversation
with James River officials (one that was repeated with Alan Davis and union officials)
indicated that both proposals were equally viable as far as the state was concerned. A
statement such as this was in keeping with assertions by state development staff that they
were in no position to choose or designate a buyer. Again, the union felt that their inter-
ests were being ignored.
Drexel Burnham Lambert staffwho has been working with union officials to discuss
the framework of their Conservatree ESOP were interested in discussing financing op-
tions with Alan Davis. Drexel had called a meeting with union and Conservatree repre-
sentatives for Thursday evening, May 5, to work out an agreement on paper. Union
members John Connolly, Joanne Gaines, and Matie Shiel stepped off the elevator at Drex-
el's downtown headquarters that night and were greeted with the news that James River
had leased their mill to Nolichucky.
At a preliminary meeting the night before, Local 121's international representative had
met with Nolichucky president Jim Montgomery. Montgomery had indicated that his
company had no plans to recognize the union if it won the lease. When Ron Carver
learned Thursday that Nolichucky had indeed signed the lease, he was outraged that state
officials had not uncovered Nolichucky 's anti-union posture. The Drexel meeting that was
to have been another step toward clinching the Conservatree plan became instead a "strat-
egy" session for dealing with the latest setback.
Earlier that day, Montgomery had bluntly stated that union workers would receive no
preferential hiring consideration in the Nolichucky Hyde Park mill: "We are an equal
opportunity employer; whether or not a union will eventually represent the workers will
depend entirely on the workers. This is the way it is in the United States." 23 Predictably,
those comments drew quick response. Mayor Flynn's spokesman, Neil Sullivan, said,
"If this is how they're responding, then we're obviously off to a bad start." Ron Carver
was more direct; "If Nolichucky thinks we will walk away from our jobs and union, they
are sadly mistaken. We will stand and fight." Before the strategy session adjourned, union
members agreed to rally at the Federal Street office of Nolichucky 's Boston attorney,
David Weinstein, the following day at noon.
On Friday, May 6, Alden Raine and Paul Eustace wrote Robert Williams, president of
James River Corporation, to voice concern over Nolichucky 's intentions and to update the
company on their progress with Conservatree.
Throughout our discussions we have emphasized two important public policy con-
cerns: that the new operator be committed to restoring union jobs, and that the mill be
used for recycling ....
We have been actively negotiating an offer of state financial assistance to the Con-
servatree Company in its proposal to buy the mill. As of this week, those negotiations
appeared to have borne fruit. One reason for our strong interest in Conservatree is
their clear commitment to work with the paperworkers' union.
The Hyde Park facility has been a union mill for decades, and should continue to be
one. Since James River will continue to own the property, we need and expect your
help in resolving this matter.
We are urging Nolichucky to work closely and cooperatively with the union in
reopening the mill, and to welcome its operation as a union shop. If Nolichucky is
unable to make such a commitment, we would strongly urge you to resume negotia-
tions with Conservatree.
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For Conservatree, this affirmation of financial support from the economic development
office came too late. Commenting on the unsuccessful Conservatree proposal to a Boston
Herald reporter, Alden Raine said, "I was disappointed. I had been expressing to James
River that our discussions with Conservatree about state assistance were down to the short
strokes." Another top state industrial development official was more optimistic about
Nolichucky's prospects and told a union representative that Nolichucky personnel had
been running other manufacturing plants and knew what they were doing: "You know in
your gut when you're working with good capable people," the official concluded, imply-
ing that the "gut feeling" hadn't been there for Conservatree. Nolichucky's business plan
didn't call for any state financial support.
The following Monday the City Council had scheduled a hearing, ostensibly to deal
with the environmental impact of solid waste disposal. Actually, the meeting had been
booked in advance to provide a forum for more discussion on the Hyde Park mill, long
before anyone imagined what was to transpire. With representatives from Nolichucky in
attendance, including David Weinstein, along with union members, the hearing turned
into a contest among councillors to defend the union. Remarks made by Hyde Park coun-
cillor Menino directed to Weinstein characterized the prevailing mood: "If you think
you're going to come into my neighborhood with 500 trucks and not rehire the good peo-
ple who worked there, and you're going to get city and state permits, you're dead
wrong." 24 The City Council then passed an ordinance prohibiting the city from buying any
Hyde Park paper products until Nolichuky agreed to "respect, recognize and negotiate"
with the union.
In an effort to salvage its by now badly tarnished image, Nolichucky brought lawyer
Dennis Kearney on board. A former Middlesex County sheriff and longtime political
player, Kearney was quick to strike a nonconfrontational, conciliatory tone. Less than one
week later, Kearney announced that Nolichucky would meet with union officials to try to
work out a hiring plan.
Union officials insisted that these meetings take place in City Hall rather than at the
State House. As far as the union was concerned, the terms of its contract were open for
negotiation but not the issue of whether or not there would be a union. Kearney main-
tained, however, that there would have to be an election after the plant reopened to vote on
union representation. Even though Eustace recommended that the union accept this offer,
union members were adamant in their refusal to yield recognition. In final negotiations,
the terms of which were worked out in the secretary of labor's State House office, the
union retained its recognition, with the specifics of its contract to be decided later. Noli-
chucky had set a target date of July 1 to bring the Hyde Park mill back into production.
Throughout the summer of 1988, meetings between the union and Nolichucky officials
were an on-again, off-again affair. By early fall, rumors had begun to circulate that Noli-
chucky Industries was in serious financial trouble. Union officials telephoned a Noli-
chucky plant in Kalamazoo, Michigan, and learned that the facility had been operational
for only two weeks and had not reached maximum capacity. They also found that another
Nolichucky venture, in Puerto Rico, had yet to open and began to reason that Hyde Park
delays were attributable to company problems elsewhere. On September 27, the Boston
Globe reported that Nolichucky was four payments behind on an $850,000 loan from
Michigan's economic development office and that its Kalamazoo mill was closed. The
fate of the Hyde Park paper mill was again uncertain.
The Hyde Park mill had now been closed for almost ten months. Reflecting on all the
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organizing, negotiating, and opportunities that had come to pass, one veteran papermaker
summed up the experience as "an emotional roller coaster." Many paperworkers had
already taken other jobs, and some in the membership had grown cynical about the mill's
ever reopening. Union leadership remained optimistic that the mill would produce again
and were confident of their local's ability to manufacture a quality product. "Still, there
were times when one couldn't help but doubt."
No Massachusetts Miracle for Conservatree
In a letter to "Friends of the Hyde Park mill" in October, Alan Davis noted that it had
been one year since Conservatree had initiated discussions with James River concerning
the purchase of the plant. Conservatree' s vision of a model employee partnership and
recycling mill prototype had begun to fade, but the October update indicated that the com-
pany wasn't ruling anything out.
No one can reliably predict what will happen next. For the record, if the Nolichucky
deal falls through, Conservatree remains interested in purchasing the mill under the
terms of our last proposal. Under these conditions, we believe our plan would be the
only viable strategy for reopening Hyde Park.
Perhaps Nolichucky will arrange new financing or sell its lease to other investors
who have enough money to put the project back on track. It's equally possible that the
mill will remain closed, a monument to corporate arrogance and the lack of environ-
mental leadership in Massachusetts state government.
Conservatree had strong opinions regarding its failed proposal, and criticism was leveled
squarely at the Dukakis administration. An October newsletter published by the company
concluded the following:
Governor Dukakis* Office of Economic Affairs, the linchpin in the financial contract,
stonewalled discussions on the proposal, finally dismissing it as too big a public invest-
ment. Seeing no demonstrated support from the Governor's office, James River even-
tually leased the mill to another company which had planned to operate the plant
non-union and without de-inking. Months later, with the lessee facing severe financial
difficulties from its two prior mill acquisitions, Hyde Park remains closed, its workers
still unemployed.
The same newsletter noted that Conservatree was presented an Outstanding Industry
Award by the National Recycling Coalition at its fall 1988 Seventh Annual National Recy-
cling Congress.
Hyde Park Paper Inc.
Before the year was out the embattled Nolichucky Industries reportedly sold its interest in
the Hyde Park mill to David Weinstein, the attorney who had first represented the com-
pany in Boston, and Robert Macy, a man described in subsequent news reports as a Cape
Cod developer. Weinstein and Macy formed a new company they named Hyde Park Paper
Inc. and planned to have the mill back on line by March 1989. Profiles of the partners
included in the company's press packet indicated that neither man had any previous expe-
rience running a paper mill or working in the paper industry. The two have had several
32
other business dealings together, including a partnership in another company, Boston
Industries Group Inc., of which Weinstein was chief executive office and Macy president.
David Weinstein also retained his position as counsel to the Boston law firm of Perkins,
Smith, Arata and Howard. His legal experience, as described in Hyde Park company
literature, included corporate and commercial law with "particular emphasis on the de-
sign of financial structures in complex commercial and residential real estate transac-
tions." Robert Macy was said to be active in real estate and business development.
In a February 3 Boston Globe report announcing the reopening of the mill, Weinstein
sounded willing to leave his Nolichucky Hyde Park experience behind: "We're going to
run a kinder, gentler paper company." A few days earlier the partners had negotiated a
new contract with the union that eliminated two holidays and required members to pay for
20 percent of their health insurance but retained premium pay for Saturday and Sunday
work.
Union members heartily endorsed the new owners' claim that "there are things that a
small entrepreneurial company can do that a major corporation can't do." During contract
ratification meetings, union treasurer Matie Shiel stood before the new owners and ex-
plained that the union could not tolerate the same corporate mentality that had prevailed
under lames River; it was equally clear to union leadership that the attitude some union
members had adopted under James River would likewise undermine the success of their
new venture.
The new partners planned to create a market niche for recycled paper manufactured at
the Hyde Park mill but conceded that their options remained open. Financing for the plan
had come entirely from private sources. In an interview on April 12, 1989, the first day
the mill had been running steadily since the shutdown, Hyde Park president David Wein-
stein acknowledged that one of its objectives was to manufacture a product that was at
least 70 percent recycled (recycled pulp is commonly mixed with virgin material to give
the final product consistency). On this day the mill was producing rolls of paper that were
84 percent recycled and the president was clearly elated. The furnish for this paper was
primarily "mill broke" or second-quality paper from other mills that is commonly reused
in-house or sold. A feedstock of this sort is expensive but not as costly as virgin pulp.
Hyde Park Paper's newly made paper was technically recycled but was not yet being made
from wastepaper that had been de-inked and was not "post-consumer" (otherwise des-
tined for disposal) in origin. One of two paper machines was back on line with a daily
production output of 123 tons and approximately one hundred workers were back on the
job. Weinstein estimated that more workers would be added as the mill stepped up
capacity.
Business was brisk for the upstart Hyde Park mill. Weinstein was aggressively courting
retail interest from leading office-supply stores, and the company had won bids to furnish
recycled paper to the Cape Cod public schools and the state of New Jersey, and would be
dealing paper to the Commonwealth of Massachusetts under the state's newly beefed-up
procurement legislation. In yet another interesting twist in the rebirth of the Hyde Park
mill, Conservatree won recycled paper bids in several states and planned to honor its new
contracts with Hyde Park Paper, including some that was to be shipped across the country
to California.
For the time being, the owners were "appreciative of the state's interest in recycling"
and had not ruled out the possibility of seeking public financing at a later date. Enthusi-
asm for the reopening was shared by workers, management, and the Hyde Park commu-
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nity. On the morning the plant came back on line, a paperworker stopped at a local coffee
shop and ordered seven dozen doughnuts for the crew at the mill. The waitress wondered
out loud where such a large order was headed, so the worker explained that they were for
employees who had been working around the clock to restart the "old Diamond mill."
Customers gathered around the counter broke into a round of applause.
Epilogue
Even though Hyde Park Paper Inc. had won contracts worth $800,000 with the U.S. Gov-
ernment Printing Office, $2.5 million in California, and was reportedly generating
$500,000 in weekly revenues, the mill was shut down in June of 1989, just three months
after its reopening. Mill executives first explained the closing as a temporary two-week
setback resulting from a short supply of operating capital. But as the summer months
passed, the mill sat idle while management remained "cautiously optimistic" that addi-
tional money could be acquired to help ease the plant over this one-time hurdle.
On October 17, 1989, the Boston Globe reported that Hyde Park Paper owners David
Weinstein and Robert Macy had filed an eight-count lender-liability suit against the Bos-
ton Trade Bank, the three-year-old institution that is said to have invested $3 million in the
mill venture. The $25 million suit alleged that the bank "precipitously and wrongfully,"
with "deceit" and "misrepresentation," cut off funding to the mill in June: "Seven
months after the bank asked Weinstein and Macy to start Hyde Park Paper, promising
sufficient financing to support the company, and 12 weeks after the start of mill opera-
tions, the bank unilaterally ceased to provide any additional money and put 115 people out
of work." The company's claim seeks to prevent the bank from liquidating the mill's
physical assets to recoup its investment and would award $75 million in damages — triple
the mill's projected annual profit.
Relations between Weinstein, Macy, and Boston Trade Bank president Daniel Ciotti
were irreparably damaged. The papermaking venture begun by Hyde Park Paper Inc.
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celebrated as a "model" for future plant closings at its April opening, was finished.
The James River Corporation was again trying to sell the mill. Months later company
officials reported that a few prospective buyers had inspected the plant, but no sale ap-
peared imminent. One state environmental official reported that no buyers seeking public
funding had surfaced. The plant remained in good repair, the boilers were on, but the
papermaking machines sat idle. For the Hyde Park paperwokers who had quit jobs to
rejoin the mill the previous spring, the situation was grim. Many were not eligible for
unemployment benefits following the June shutdown. According to union treasurer Made
Shiel, "People are hurting ... I have 85 percent given up, and I would imagine that other
people have too ... I can't see them taking the same chance again."
All the while, city and state officials had made little headway with new recycling initia-
tives and appeared to be at odds over future direction. In the fall of 1989 an official of the
city of Boston's Public Works Department charged that promises of state financial assis-
tance have not been made good while acknowledging that the city is proceeding "cau-
tiously" with plans to expand a pilot curbside recycling program and add monthly drop-
off centers in two neighborhoods. The state countered that substantial financial assistance
had been offered but that the city had yet to "come back with a response." Meanwhile, in
its latest draft of a state solid waste master plan, the Department of Environmental Protec-




On Wednesday, August 15, 1990, more than one year after Hyde Park Paper Inc. dis-
solved, it was announced that the mill had been sold for $7 million to an investor group
headed by the Tembec Paper Company of Canada. At a press conference in the mill the
following day, state and local officials gathered to welcome the Patriot Paper Corporation,
as the latest owners are known, to Hyde Park. Governor Dukakis was on hand to salute
Patriot Paper's plan to restart de-inking operations, acknowledging that such a mill "helps
solve a very, very serious environmental problem." Speaking to the region's fiscal woes,
Mayor Flynn pointed to the mill's reopening as a signal that the city is holding its own:
"We're getting a lot of things done, even in a period of economic uncertainty." For many
of the papermakers who had rejoined the mill for three months in 1989 and endured the
latest fourteen-month shutdown, the jobs they left behind would be available immediately.
Patriot Paper's business plan calls for a multiyear, $54 million mill retrofit to install
state-of-the-art pulping, de-inking, and wastewater treatment equipment. The investment
is being financed in part through the sale of $37.5 million in tax-exempt bonds secured by
the Boston Industrial Development Financing Authority. Patriot Paper president Mark
Baisch brought the plant back on line September 4, 1990, with one machine operating,
and resumed full production in January 1991 . With a background in recycled boxboard
papermaking, Baisch was quickly able to resume production in Hyde Park by relying
solely on several grades of wastepaper blended in a custom feedstock that required con-
stant monitoring and manipulation.
By November 1990, Patriot Paper was manufacturing paper that was 100 percent recy-
cled, approximately 10 percent of which was post-consumer in origin. It appeared that the
corporation's ties to a Canadian paper company were particularly helpful with regard to
sourcing wastepaper. Much of the feedstock the mill was pulping in November came from
a company that had misprinted or otherwise voided a particular job using paper made
from Tembec pulp. When purchasing this feedstock, Patriot Paper officials knew exactly
what type of paper they were buying. Such a strategy eliminated some of the guesswork
involved in buying wastepaper, as there are dozens of grades of paper and various levels of
contamination associated with paper recycling. For the plant to routinely accept commer-
cially generated, post-consumer wastepaper, the product will need to be of consistent
grade with a minimum of contaminants (such as the plastic windows sometimes used in
envelopes, sticky labels, and so forth).
Baisch projects that the post-consumer content of Patriot's paper could eventually ex-
ceed 50 percent. By late 1991 , with the new de-inking facility complete and employing a
combination of flotation and washing technology, the owners believe that the Hyde Park
facility will be the most advanced recycling mill in the United States. In the meantime,
Hyde Park paperworkers are expertly utilizing existing equipment to perform a combina-
tion of chemical de-inking and pulp washing to prepare their feedstock. The new flotation
de-inking technology to be incorporated in production will use clay to help separate ink
from paper. Many glossy paper stocks, often used in magazines, are typically clay coated,
and the city's recycling efforts stand to benefit from new demand for old magazines when
the flotation equipment comes on line. The leftover clay sludge from the de-inking proc-
ess may also play a role in the region's waste management practices, as it is potentially
useful as a capping material to seal landfills once they reach capacity.
The Patriot Paper venture in Hyde Park holds new promise for the mill's employees as
well. The mill continues to operate as a union shop, and the paperworkers have been ex-
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tended a 10 percent employee stock ownership plan in addition to a profit-sharing pro-
gram based on the mill's operating profit, to be distributed on an equal basis as a percent-
age of hours worked. With the supply of post-consumer wastepaper collected in recycling
programs across the country continually expanding and unprecedented consumer interest
in recycled products in the marketplace, demand for recycled paper has never been
greater. Walking through the mill one evening in November, while bales of wastepaper
were steadily conveyed to a watery bath and beaters churned away, a gaping hole in the
plant floor waited in anticipation of new equipment, and a ribbon of paper some ten feet
wide wound its way continuously through a paper machine gathering finally in huge rolls,
this observer saw evidence that a new era of papermaking in Hyde Park was under way.&t-'
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